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RECENT DECISION
Attorney's Withholding Of Tangible
Evidence Of Crime Held Not Protected
By Attorney-Client Privilege.
An individual accused of armed rob-
bery sought the legal aid of defendant,
an attorney. After consulting prominent
lawyers for advice, defendant transferred
the weapon and stolen money from his
client's safe deposit box to his own pur-
suant to a power of attorney which au-
thorized him to "so dispose of the said
contents as he sees fit. . . ." He intended
to assert the attorney-client privilege in
an attempt to exclude the items from evi-
dence if discovered by the authorities,
and thereby significantly burden the pros-
ecution's case. He planned to give the
money to the proper authorities only after
his client's interests were sufficiently pro-
tected. In a proceeding instituted against
him for unprofessional conduct, the United
States District Court, Eastern District of
Virginia, en banc, suspended defendant
for eighteen months, holding that his con-
duct, being outside the bounds of state
and federal law, was a violation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the Vir-
ginia State Bar. The Court further held
that defendant could not successfully claim
the protection of the attorney-client privil-
ege. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360
(E.D. Va. 1967).
At the turn of the century, the legal
profession became the subject of much
criticism, emanating from within and with-
out the profession, concerning its need to
modernize and codify its standards of
ethics.' In response to this criticism, and
inspired by the adoption of codes of
ethics in several states,2 the American Bar
Association in 1908 adopted the Canons
of Professional Ethics.3 The by-laws of
the Association were then amended to
authorize the creation of a Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances to
express opinions concerning interpretation
of the Canons when consulted by mem-
1 COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND AD-
MISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT, 20 ABA REP.
349, 377 (1897).
2 COMMITTEE ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, REPORT, 31 ABA.REP. 676 (1907).
3 33 ABA REP. 55-86 (1908). The original draft
consisted of thirty-two canons. An additional
thirteen canons were adopted in 1928, Canon
46 in 1933, and Canon 47 in 1937. H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 24-26 (1953),
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bers of the bar or any officer or com-
mittee of a state or local bar association.'
Among the original thirty-two canons
adopted in 1908 was Canon 15 entitled,
"How Far a Lawyer May Go in Sup-
porting a Client's Cause," which states
that "It]he lawyer owes 'entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability,' to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally ap-
plied." The canon warns, however, that
this loyalty and enthusiasm of the at-
torney does not justify disloyalty to the
law or the dictates of his conscience. The
lawyer's duties are "to be performed with-
in and not without the bounds of the
law." The attorney "must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client."
For example, the advocate cannot prop-
erly allow his name to be used in order
to promote his client's business, 5 for to do
so would contravene Canon 29.6
The attorney-client relationship is fur-
ther clarified by Canon 37 which declares
that the lawyer is "to preserve his client's
confidences." This doctrine was original-
ly formulated in the early common law,
dating from the time of Elizabeth L.7 Dur-
ing the 17th century, the integrity of one's
vow of secrecy, given to another in ex-
4 H. DRINKER, supra note 3, at 30-32.
5 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 76 (1932).
6Canon 29 provides that a lawyer "should
strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administra-
tion of justice."
7 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaugh-
ton ed. 1961).
change for a disclosure, was often pro-
tected by the courts. A witness could
assert the vow as grounds for refusing to
answer a question. s At this time in his-
tory, the confidence between attorney and
client was also predicated upon this
"point of honor," rather than on any of
the policy considerations which are offered
today to justify the privilege. As a log-
ical consequence, it followed that the
privilege could be waived by the attorney,
for he was the one who took the pledge
of secrecy, expressly or impliedly, and it
was his obligation of honor which the
court was preserving.9  If public esteem
were unimportant to him he could in-
famously breach his vow.
In the eighteenth century this theory
was abandoned 1Q and a new explanation
had to be offered for the privilege if it
was to continue. It was, and still is,
argued that the privilege is essential to
promote freedom of consultation with legal
advisers by clients." The services of a
lawyer are often indispensable to the vin-
dication of one's legal rights and only if
the attorney is immune from compelled
disclosures will the client be able to ef-
fectively utilize the counsel's services. If
the fear of divulgence constantly over-
shadows the client, he instinctively will
withhold from his attorney information he
desires to keep secret, and in so doing
will frustrate his attorney's attempts to as-
sert all the legal remedies and protections
81d. at § 2286.
, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 7.
10 Ibid.
11 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 239 (1952). See
Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Commu-
nication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF.
L. REV. 487 (1928).
afforded a person in the client's position.
The following has been offered as a
statement of the privilege containing all
the essential elements:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal ad-
viser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanent-
ly protected (7) from disclosure by him-
self or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived.12
It should be emphasized that commu-
nications between the attorney and his
client are the subject of the protection,
and it is necessary to delimit the extent
to which the word "communications" is
applied in order to define the scope of
the privilege. For the purpose of dis-
cussing the instant case, the query may
be confined to answering the question of
whether chattels handed over to the at-
torney, by the client, as part of the com-
munication between the two, relating to
professional advice, is encompassed by
the privilege.
Canon 37 does not specifically limit
the attorney's duty to preserve his client's
confidences to oral communications. It has
been argued that the policy considerations
which are presented to justify protection
of oral communications are likewise pres-
ent when a chattel is handed over to the
12 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaugh-
ton ed. 1961). For a statutory definition see
N.Y. CPLR 4503(a). For a compilation of
statutes in other jurisdictions, see 8 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 n.2 (McNaughton ed.
1961).
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attorney by the client.13
However, the courts generally do not
adopt this approach. In determining
whether the client's chattel which is in
the attorney's hands is immune from com-
pelled presentations before the court,
agency principles are applied irrespective
of the attorney-client privilege.' 4 If the
client can be subjected to a legal search
and seizure, the attorney cannot assert the
attorney-client privilege to exclude the
evidence. The chattel enjoys no greater
protection while in the possession of the
attorney than it did while in the posses-
sion of the client. To hold otherwise
would enable a suspect legally to ex-
clude incriminating evidence by merely
entrusting the items to his attorney.' 5
In the instant case, 16 the legal services
of defendant were sought by one Cook
who was accused of armed robbery.
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation had confiscated $348 from Cook
when defendant arrived at his client's
home. Later in the day, defendant was
informed by one of the agents that some
of the bills which had been taken from
Cook were identified as a portion of
the stolen money. Although Cook did
not confess, defendant never fully be-
lieved his alibi.
The balance of Cook's money remained
in a safe deposit box he rented in a local
13See Comment, Fruits of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Incriminating Evidence and Con-
flicting Duties, 3 DUQUESNE L. REV. 239, 242
(1965).
14 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (McNaugh-
ton ed. 1961).
15 Ibid.
16 In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.
1967).
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bank. Disturbed as to what should be
done with this money, defendant consulted
a former officer of the local bar asso-
ciation and informed him of his idea
of transferring it from Cook's safe deposit
box to his own, believing that this would
prevent Cook from disposing of it. Thus,
defendant hoped to claim the attorney-
client privilege if the money were found
by the authorities. In this manner, he
hoped to exclude the balance from evi-
dence, break the link between Cook and
the stolen money, and destroy the pre-
sumption of guilt which possession of
the money would create. His colleague
approved of the idea so long as it was
not done surreptitiously, and that defend-
ant inform his client that the money would
be going back to the rightful owners. De-
fendant prepared a power of attorney au-
thorizing him to enter Cook's safe deposit
box, remove the contents, "and so dis-
pose of the said contents as he sees
fit. .... , 17 He did not follow the ad-
vice he had received to tell Cook that
the money was to be returned, testifying,
somewhat nebulously, that to do so specif-
ically in the power of attorney might
jeopardize the confidence of his client.
He felt that he was sufficiently protected
by the more general declaration of author-
ity quoted above, planning to "dispose of
the said contents as he sees fit," namely,
returning it to the rightful owner, at
whatever time he deemed that it would
not hurt Cook.
When defendant opened Cook's box,
he found not only the money, but also a
sawed-off shotgun which he knew re-
portedly had been used in the bank rob-
17 Id. at 363.
bery of which his client was accused.
Nevertheless, he transferred all the con-
tents of Cook's box to his own. Within
a half-hour of the transfer, defendant con-
sulted a retired judge who was then a
distinguished professor of law and in-
formed him of his actions because he
wanted responsible people of the com-
munity to know his motives.
Cook eventually was indicted for rob-
bery, and after Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation agents searched Cook's and
defendant's boxes and discovered the in-
criminating evidence, the court removed
defendant as Cook's attorney and sus-
pended him from practice before the court
until further order. Within five days, the
United States Attorney initiated disbar-
ment proceedings against defendant for
violations of Canons 15 and 32.18
In disbarment proceedings, the rule laid
down in some cases is that the alleged
wrongdoing must have been intentional
in order to constitute cause for the dis-
barment of an attorney. Not only must
the act itself be proven to have been
committed, but the bad or fraudulent mo-
tive for the commission thereof must be
established, and unless this is done dis-
barment is not authorized. 19
The Court concluded that these re-
quirements were satisfied in the instant
18The State of Virginia has adopted the ABA
Canons.
19 In re Lasecki, 358 111. 69, 192 N.E. 655
(1934); In re Zanger, 266 N.Y. 165, 194 N.E.
72 (1935). The court, in In re Donaghy, 402
111. 120, 123, 83 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1949),
explained:
The legal calling is a time-honored profes-
sion and the courts owe a duty to protect
the public from impositions and improper
case.20  It was reasoned that defend-
ant took possession of the money, know-
ing the same to have been stolen, and the
shotgun, cognizant that it was an instru-
mentality of the crime, intending to con-
ceal the items until his client was suf-
ficiently protected and thus attempt to
frustrate the government's efforts to suc-
cessfully prosecute Cook. No statute or
canon of ethics was considered to have
justified defendant's activities and thus
altered the nature of his motive.21
The Court easily rejected the conten-
tion that defendant was unaware that the
money was stolen.22  He knew that the
man who committed the robbery used a
sawed-off shotgun and was well advised
of his client's guilt when he found the
shotgun in Cook's box and was informed
that some of the bills in Cook's posses-
sion were identified as bait money from
the bank.2 3  Quoting from United States
v. Werner,24 and Melson v. United States,25
the Court recognized that the extent of
the defendant's "knowledge" that the
money was stolen need only have been
enough to allow him to draw a reasonable
inference of such fact, and not of such a
degree as to enable him to testify in
practices. . . . Such duty, and the manner
in which it is exercised, must not be des-
potic, but the charges must be sustained by
clear and convincing proof and the mis-
conduct must be shown to have been
fraudulent and the result of improper mo-
tives, and the proof must show intent.
20 In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D.
Va. 1967).
21 Id. at 369.
221 d. at 364-65.
23 Ibid.
24 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1947).
25 207 F.2d 558, 559 (4th Cir. 1953).
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court. 26  Therefore, defendant was found
to have violated state law 27 by conceal-
ing goods known to have been stolen, and
in so doing contravened Canon 15, which
states that the lawyer must assist his
client within the bounds of the law, and
Canon 37, which denies the lawyer the
right to render service involving disloy-
alty to the law.
No merit was found in the contention
that defendant was acting within the
bounds of the attorney-client privilege for
defendant's "conduct went far beyond the
receipt and retention of a confidential
communication from his client," which
is all that the privilege purports to
protect.2
8
Defendant also relied upon case au-
thority which denied the government the
right to subpoena an attorney to pro-
duce client's papers which were inad-
missible in court due to the client's fourth
and fifth amendment rights, i.e., these
cases held that the attorney was allowed
to assert his client's constitutional priv-
ilege. 29  The Court held that the argu-
261 n re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 364-65 (E.D.
Va. 1967).2 7 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-107 (1950): "If any
person buy or receive from another person, or
aid in concealing, any stolen goods or other
thing, knowing the same to have been stolen,
he shall be deemed guilty of larceny there-
o f . . . .
218 In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 365 (E.D.
Va. 1967).29 See, e.g., United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1963); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956). Contra,
Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th
Cir. 1963). For a discussion of the attorney's
right to assert his client's constitutional privi-
leges and of the Judson and Bouschor holdings,
see Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privi-
leges, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).
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ment was faulty because defendant's client
had no constitutional right to refuse to
produce the evidence in question. Since
the attorney's claim of privilege is de-
rived from his client, defendant had no
privilege to assert.3 0 The Court drew the
now well-established distinction! between
merely evidentiary materials which 'may
not be seized, and those instrumentalities
and fruits of crime which may be validly
seized."'
The Court dealt rather harshly with the
efforts of an attorney to act prudently and
to respect the often conflicting duties owed
to the court, of which he is an officer,
and to his client, for whom he is an ad-
vocate. The lawyer's activity is often
judged by different and conflicting stand-
ards which produce varying solutions and
appraisals, and this state of affairs creates
such uncertainty and disillusionment with-
in the profession as to be a contributing
factor to the apathy and public criticism of
the profession.3 2
A superficial glance at the Canons will
reveal many inherent conflicting duties
which can prompt numerously trouble-
some ethical problems for the advocate.
As has already been seen, Canon 37 es-
tablishes "the duty of a lawyer to pre-
serve his client's confidences," while Canon
15 warns that the advocate must operate
within the confines of the law. The Com-
30 In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 366 (E.D.
Va. 1967).
31 In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 366 (E.D.
Va. 1967). The Court quoted from Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); see 8 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDE14CE § 2264 (McNaughton ed.
1961).
32 See Starts, Attorneys in Doubt, 8 CATHOLIC
LAW. 131 (1962).
mittee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances 11 has already stated that the lawyer,
aware of the location of his fugitive client
who has broken bond, should not divulge
such information to the authorities who
are seeking to arrest him. 4 Yet, one who
knows that a person is being sought by
law enforcement officials for the commis-
sion of a crime, himself commits a crime
if he, with intent to delay or hinder dis-
covery, conceals such person, or prevents
or obstructs another by means of decep-
tion, from performing an act which might
aid in the discovery of the accused."
Further confusion is added by a 1936
opinion of the Committee which states
that an attorney's knowledge of the where-
abouts of his client who has jumped bail,
fled the jurisdiction of the court, failed
to appear for trial, and remained without
the jurisdiction is not privileged.-" The
Committee refused to admit that this
opinion overruled the former, but merely
said that, on the facts, the opinions are
not in conflict. The rationale of the latter
opinion hinges upon the nature of the
client's activity, characterized as a "con-
tinuing wrong," and the communications
relating thereto not being privileged by
the express provision of the canon itself.37
The Committee states that "[w]hen the
33 Hereinafter referred to as the Committee.
34 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 23 (1930).
35 N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW §§ 205.50-.65 (effective
Sept. 1, 1967).
a16 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 155 (1936).
37 "The announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he [the lawyer] is bound
to respect." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, No. 37.
communication by the client to his at-
torney is in respect to the future com-
mission of an unlawful act or to a con-
tinuing wrong, the communication is not
privileged." '8 The canon clearly justifies
the Committee's remarks concerning the
intent to commit an unlawful act. How-
ever, the removal of "continuing wrongs"
from the protection of the privilege was
an attempt by the Committee to supply
a missing element to the Canons, in order
to reach the conclusion believed to be
proper.
The above is offered as an example of
the difficulties that may arise in inter-
preting only one of the Canons. Inter-
pretative difficulties like these permeate
the entire code, most of the problems be-
ing created by the gross vagueness of the
provisions. These inexact pronounce-
ments are made the basis for disbarring
an attorney, and it is questionable why a
group of lawyers, who would painstakingly
work to draft a concise and clearly de-
fined criminal statute, able to withstand
the rigorous tests of the due process
clause, would throw together such an
imprecise code to guide their own ac-
tivities and supply the grounds for dis-
barment for the deviation therefrom. It
would be expected that where their own
interests are so significantly affected they
would afford themselves the clearest defin-
ition of the conduct which would warrant
disciplinary action.
As a rebuttal to the argument for a
more narrowly drafted set of canons, it
may be contended that a detailed code
3" ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 155 (1936).
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may encourage lawyers to go as close
to the line as possible without violating
the provisions. Only a broadly worded
code would give a court the flexibility
often needed in dealing with borderline
activities of attorneys. However, at pres-
ent, a lawyer, faced with a perplexing
ethical problem, consults the Canons for
help and witnesses a hodgepodge of con-
flicting precepts which patently require
him to serve two masters, offering no
reconciliation for the situation where the
interests of the two masters clash. Cog-
nizant of the relatively low percentage of
lawyers who are actually disbarred from
practice,3 ' and of the rigorous task that
is incumbent upon the government to es-
tablish its case, the lawyer is tempted
to "gamble," believing that the probability
is against the propriety of his actions ever
being questioned. Vague canons are more
susceptible to manipulation to rationalize
one's questionable activities.
As an escape, the lawyer should more
often consult the ethics committee of the
local bar association. The larger asso-
ciations publish their opinions, which are
readily available to members. These opin-
ions apply the vague precepts of the
Canons to specific factual patterns, and
offer a solution which establishes a prece-
39 See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BOARD, Report, 409 (1967), wherein the
following statistics are given, showing the re-
sults of disciplinary proceedings in New York
State during the judicial year from July 1,
1965 through June 30, 1966:
Disbarments 14
Struck from roll 14
Suspensions 12
Censures 13
Charges Dismissed 5
Reinstatements 10
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dent. To those who argue that it is es-
sential for the Canons to be vague and
flexible in order to be effectively applied
to the difficult and varied factual sit-
uations which may arise in the future, it
can be asked: Is it not true that the con-
tinued process of construction and ap-
plication of the Canons, which is exercised
by the various ethics committees, tends
to more precisely define the scope of each
provision and, in effect, redraft, in a
rather haphazard manner, the existing code
into one which is of the very kind which
they criticize? Are not each of the opin-
ions of the committees to be read in con-
junction with the Canons and to be eval-
uated and weighed on the scales while
seeking a proper balance between the
interests of the varying parties that in-
fluence the lawyer, i.e., are not the specific
holdings of the committees to be adhered
to as much as the Canons proper? Is
not this process akin to that exercised
by the United States Supreme Court in
construing another intentionally vague
document, the federal constitution, where
the Court in recent years has construed
the subject of its construction with such
specificity as to be tantamount to the
process of legislating? 40
Turning our attention from some of the
inadequacies of the Canons, a discussion
of the predicament in which defendant
found himself seems appropriate. It has
been argued that, for the same reasons
which justify the attorney-client privilege
as applied to oral communications, incrim-
inating chattels which are given to the
40 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
attorney by the client should enjoy the
same protection of confidentiality and
immunity.41 The spoken word is but a
symbolic utterance relating to a physical
or spiritual entity or event perceived by
the mind. The utterance in and of itself
is meaningless; it is its symbolic char-
acter which constitutes the bulk of its
value as a tool of man. Some seem sat-
isfied by merely stating that the chattel is
corroborative proof of the validity of
what the client orally tells his attorney.
If the latter is protected, it is urged, the
former should be also.4 2
If this argument be accepted it would
logically follow that defendant could not
be said to have violated the Cations be-
cause of his possession of the stolen
money. As previously discussed, the
Committee has held that the attorney is
not required to disclose the whereabouts
of his fugitive client who has broken bond,
despite the fact that he may be violating a
statute by hindering prosecution. 4 3  The
attorney is protected because he has acted
in accordance with the requirements of
the attorney-client privilege. Following
this reasoning, defendant would not be
held accountable for violating the Vir-
ginia possession of stolen goods statute
41 Comment, Fruits of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Incriminating Evidence and Con-
flicting Duties, 3 DUQUESNE L. REv. 239, 242
(1965).
42 "Like a photograph used in a court to pic-
torially convey a witness' testimony, incriminat-
ing evidence produced by a client is the real,
actual, or demonstrative communication of a
secret or confidence. It is a visual communica-
tion of a secret or confidence. In a sense, it
is the corroborative proof of what the client
tells in the strictest of confidence." Ibid.
4' ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 23 (1930).
because his conduct would be in accord-
ance with the Canon concerning con-
fidentiality. To those who would say that
this is practicing a fraud on the court, at-
tention need only be directed to Opinion
287 of the Committee, wherein it was
held that an attorney need not disclose
to the court the subsequent revelation that
his client perjured himself in a divorce
proceeding. 4 The interest of the client
prevailed over that of the court.
It must be admitted that there is one
significant difference between the fact pat-
terns of the fugitive and perjury situations
and that of the Ryder case. In the
former instances the attorney passively re-
sisted prejudicing his client's interests by
failing to assist in discovering the where-
abouts of his client, or informing the
court of the subsequently discovered fraud
perpetrated on it. Most would agree that
if, in the fugitive case, the attorney took
affirmative steps to aid the flight of his
client, such as allowing him to use his
home as a sanctuary, or in the perjury
case, he actively participated in deceiving
the court, his conduct would be unques-
tionably reprehensible. And yet it has
been suggested that if the attorney-client
privilege were extended to chattels, Ry-
der's conduct could be justified despite
his positive efforts to conceal the stolen
goods.
In objective fairness to this line of
reasoning, it should be emphasized that
there is a very basic difference between
an oral communication and a physically
existing chattel. When the client verbally
communicates with his attorney, the
words, once uttered, are clandestinely
44 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953).
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stored within the mind of the advocate,
unobservable by the senses of another
human being. When a law enforcement
agent approaches the attorney and asks
him the whereabouts of his client, the
attorney can effectively protect the inter-
ests of his client without taking any af-
firmative action. He merely can refuse
to assist, while asserting the attorney-
client privilege. If the attorney refuses
to cooperate, there is no way in which
the communication may be revealed.
But if for the sake of argument the
privilege be extended to chattels, where
the client hands the items to the attorney,
they are still perceivable by the senses of
other persons. If the privilege is to be
at all meaningful, the attorney is forced
to take affirmative steps to conceal their
existence and thereby honor the con-
fidences of his client. Of what practical
value would such a privilege be if the
client placed the items in question upon
the lawyer's desk while the lawyer was
acting in his professional capacity, and
it was necessary that they remain exposed
because the attorney could not take pos-
itive action to conceal them? The client
would be prejudiced because he divulged
the existence of the chattels under the
guise of the protection of the attorney-
client privilege.
It would be unsatisfactory to conclude
that it is unnecessary for the attorney to
conceal them at all by arguing that if the
evidence were confiscated, the attorney
could assert the privilege and exclude the
items from evidence anyway. The client
should not be exposed to the added risk
that his case will be further burdened by
knowledge of the incriminating items be-
cause he attempted to apprise his at-
RECENT DECISION
torney of all the circumstances of the
case.
Unfortunately for defendant, the courts
have refused to be so conceptual and
extend the attorney-client privilege to
chattels. As previously indicated, the
attorney-client relationship is treated as
any other agency relationship when de-
termining whether the attorney may ex-
clude from evidence his client's chattels
in his possession. The courts are unwill-
ing to allow the privilege to be indis-
criminately and abusively used as a shield
to allow criminals to legitimately exclude
incriminating evidence, not constitutional-
ly protected, by merely giving it to an
attorney. The importance of this policy
strongly outweighs that of the privilege.
The non-existence of the privilege
leaves unprotected the activities of one in
defendant's position. There exists no ex-
planation, such as a professional confi-
dence, for the violation of the state stat-
ute. The holding of the Court appears to
stand on solid ground. The money and
weapon do not come within the privilege,
and defendant's possession thereof vio-
lated the law and, in turn, the express
provisions of the Canons. Consequently,
an attorney, approached by a client who
has committed a robbery, cannot ethically
or legally take possession of the stolen
goods or the weapon.
The question then arises as to what
the attorney should do. Before attempt-
ing to answer this question, it is advis-
able to emphasize that we are operating
under the adversary system. The two
opposing counsel compete with one an-
other, the by-product of the process hope-
fully being truth and justice .4 5 One of
the basic concepts of criminal law is that
the prosecution must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the guilt of the defend-
ant. The defendant and his attorney,
functioning within the adversary system,
neither desire to, nor are required to, aid
the prosecution in the execution of its
task. The attorney, owing undivided
fidelity to his client, should not turn the
evidence in to the prosecutor. If the
client wishes to enter a not guilty plea
and place the burden upon the state to
prove its case, the attorney has no obliga-
tion voluntarily to offer to the state in-
criminating evidence known to exist.
Furthermore, assuming the client ad-
mitted his guilt in confidence, if the at-
torney were to turn in the evidence, such
action would be objectionable because of
the same policy considerations which jus-
tify the attorney-client privilege. If the
attorney could turn in any incriminating
evidence against the will of his client, the
client would hesitate to reveal all relevant
information to him and thus frustrate the
spirit of his constitutional right to coun-
sel. The client would feel betrayed since
the attorney knew of the incriminating
evidence only because the client told him
of its existence under assurances of non-
prejudice to the client's cause. The same
policy which supports the obligation of
confidentiality precludes the attorney from
prejudicing his client's interest in any way
because of knowledge gained in his pro-
fessional capacity.
The attorney cannot tell his client to
dispose of the evidence entirely. In Clark
45See C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 1-5 (1954).
v. State,4 6 the court held admissible the
testimony of a telephone operator who
overheard the conversation between the
accused murderer and his attorney,
wherein the client admitted his guilt and
the attorney advised him to get rid of
the murder weapon. While discussing the
nature of the attorney-client privilege, the
court noted the well established exception
to the privilege. Public policy strongly
demands that no protection be afforded
the communications between attorney and
client when advice as to how the client
may commit a crime is sought." The
court stated, in denying defendant's mo-
tion for a rehearing:
We think this . . . rule must extend to
one who, having committed a crime,
seeks or takes counsel as to how he
shall escape arrest and punishment, such
as advice regarding the destruction or
disposition of the murder weapon or of
the body following a murder. 48
The court refused to hold that the ad-
vice was incidental to the preparation of
the client's legitimate defense, 49 and sar-
castically suggested that if the attorney
were to be called to the witness stand
and asked questions, he would more ap-
propriately assert his fifth amendment
right rather than the attorney-client
privilege.
5 0
The only course of action open to the
attorney is to outline the status of the
law in the area and let the client decide
40 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953).
47 Id. at 199, 261 S.W.2d at 347.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
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what to do with the evidence. He should
mention the unfavorable effect that dis-
covery of the evidence would have, and
his legal and ethical inability to take
possession of the items. The argument
can be made that the suggestion is tanta-
mount to telling the client to destroy the
evidence. In rebuttal, it can be said that
the attorney should not presume that the
client will improperly use the legal advice
given. It should be remembered that it
is the client who is hiring the attorney
and he is entitled to have legal informa-
tion and to make his own decision as to
how to act upon it. The lawyer should
not be paternalistic towards the client and
assume that he will imprudently act
upon his newly discovered legal knowl-
edge. The lawyer has the obligation to
furnish the client with all legal informa-
tion which is relevant and the client has
the right to possess it. It is a basic
doctrine of law that all are presumed to
be knowledgable as to its contents, and
it would be odd, indeed, if the attorney
were ethically bound not to enable this
legal fiction to become a reality because
of the possibility that a more sophisti-
cated comprehension of the law might
invite improper use of its loopholes by
the client. If such a fear exists, indeed,
all law schools should close their doors
because the student's extensive familiarity
with the law will invite unscrupulous ap-
plication of it to his own advantage.
Furthermore, the client who seriously
believes the pronouncements of the pro-
fession concerning the privilege of con-
fidentiality will be unjustly penalized for
revealing to the attorney the existence of
this evidence if the attorney will subse-
RECENT DECISION
quently hesitate in informing the client of
the legal principles involved.
These remarks are offered as a sug-
gested course of action which an attorney
in defendant's position should take in
light of the holding in the instant case.
But, it should be noted that prior to this
holding, defendant had carefully evalu-
ated his contemplated course of action
and sought the advice of several prom-
inent members of the profession. These
men, whose judgment is not to be taken
lightly, basically approved of defendant's
plan. Defendant's reward for his diligent
ENTRAPMENT
(Continued)
rule would seem a clearly insufficient basis
on which to ground the application of the
defense in New York.
Another inadequacy in the new entrap-
ment section is the failure to establish a
strong policy to guide the courts. Such
a policy is essential to the procedural
determinations which will have to be
made when the defense is pleaded. An
example of the necessity for a consistent
policy is the problem, previously dis-
cussed, of the extent to which evidence
showing predisposition will be allowed.
If the section is directed primarily at the
efforts was an eighteen-month suspension.
This case should emphatically demon-
strate the need for a more precisely draft-
ed code.
It is also submitted that additional
canons should be drafted to deal spe-
cifically with the activities of the criminal
lawyer. The gravity of the issues involved
in a criminal case, plus the special con-
sideration generally given defense lawyers
in criminal cases, militate towards an
explicit recognition of the distinction by
the Canons.
misconduct of the police, then the dis-
position of the defendant to commit a
crime is at best a secondary issue and
the evidence presented on this question
will be limited. On the other hand, if
the conduct of the police merely forms
the basis of the defense, then any evi-
dence having bearing on the defendant's
predisposition must be admitted. It is to
this extent that a definitive policy state-
ment is of paramount importance. The
defense of entrapment has been available
in federal proceedings for over half a
century without a final resolution of the
more difficult questions involved in its
use. This must not be allowed to become
the case in New York.
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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS
(Continued)
In seeking to attain the application of
the equal protection clause to the laws on
illegitimacy, the author advocates that, at
one end of the spectrum of legislation,
the illegitimate should be given all the
support rights of a legitimate child. The
other extreme would be paternal affection,
a matter which the author feels cannot be
legislated in the illegitimate's favor. Other
matters of legislation, such as intestacy,
welfare, and the use of the paternal name
would fall somewhere in between.
The author's argument for legal equality
for illegitimates is a convincing one. The
child is an unwitting victim of a situation
over which he could exercise no control.
There seems little justification for punish-
ing him for this fact by giving him second-
class legal rights. Although he will never
be free of social stigma, there is no
sound justification for denying him the
legal rights of all citizens. While Mr.
Krause's explanation of the "real" reason
for discriminatory legislation is somewhat
oversimplified, it seems clear that an il-
legitimate child's rights outweigh other
considerations for such discriminatory
legislation.
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